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Model Sentencing Guidelines §5.1 Departures
(a) In general
The sentencing court may impose a sentence below the
applicable guideline range if there exists a mitigating cir-
cumstance or combination of circumstances of a kind or
to a degree not adequately taken into account in formu-
lating the guidelines such that, in light of the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant and in order to advance the
purposes of sentencing set forth in i8 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(2),
(6), and (7), a sentence lower than that prescribed in the
applicable guideline range is appropriate.
(b) Circumstances not adequately taken into account in
formulating the guidelines
(i) Identified circumstances-A sentence below the
otherwise applicable guideline range may properly
be based on a circumstance identified in these
Guidelines as one justifying a departure.
(2) Unidentified circumstances-A sentence below the
otherwise applicable guideline range may properly
be based on a circumstance not identified in these
Guidelines as one justifying a departure if the court
determines that the circumstance is relevant to
determining an appropriate sentence and if the cir-
cumstance is of such a nature or is present to such
a degree as to render the case exceptional.
(3) Circumstances present to a degree not adequately
taken into consideration-A sentence below the
otherwise applicable guideline range may be war-
ranted even though the circumstance that forms the
basis for the departure is taken into consideration
in determining the guideline range or is enumer-
ated as a factor to be considered in setting the
sentence within the applicable range only if the
court determines that such circumstance is present
in the offense to a degree substantially in excess of,
or substantially below, that which is ordinarily
involved in that kind of offense.
(4) Circumstances not ordinarily relevant-A circum-
stance identified in the guidelines as not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence below
the applicable guideline range is warranted may be
relevant to this determination only if such circum-
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stance is present to an exceptional degree or distin-
guishes the case as an exceptional one in a way that
it is significant to the purposes of sentencing.
(c) Multiple circumstances
The court may impose a sentence below the applicable
guideline range based on a combination of two or more
circumstances, none of which independently is suffi-
cient to warrant a departure, only if each of the
identified circumstances is present to a substantial
degree and if all of the identified circumstances, taken
together, make the case an exceptional one.
(d) Requirement of written reasons
If the court imposes a sentence below the applicable
guideline range, it shall, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
3553(c), state its specific reasons for departure in open
court at the time of sentencing and in the written order
of judgment and commitment, except to the extent that
it relies upon statements received in camera pursuant
to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32, in which case the court shall state
that such statements were received and that the court
relied upon the content of such statements.
(e) Appellate review
The decision to impose a sentence below the applicable
guideline range shall be reviewable on appeal. The
standard of review as to the decision to impose a sen-
tence below the applicable range, and as to the extent
of the departure below the applicable range, shall be
abuse of discretion.
Application Notes:
i. For purposes of applying this provision, a circumstance is
deemed to have been taken into account in formulating the
guidelines if it is: (a) afactor determinative of offense level
required to be determined at trial or admitted by the defen-
dant in accordance with Model Sentencing Guidelines ffl.3;
or (b) an aggravating or mitigating factor identified as one
to be considered by the court in determining the defendant's
sentence within the applicable sentencing range.
Drafter's Commentary
General Observations
A central component of the guidelines structure envi-
sioned by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was judicial
oeaurs .M dMsentancing GuidaOnes §5o2
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authority to depart from the guideline range in the minor-
ity of cases where a within-range sentence was
inappropriate. As the Sentencing Commission observes in
its background commentary to the current general depar-
ture provision, U.S.S.G. 5K2.o, the departure power
serves at least two key functions. First, because no set of
rules can anticipate or account for "the vast range of
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing deci-
sion,"' a departure power is essential to any properly
designed guidelines system. Without the flexibility
afforded by a power to respond to unusual or unantici-
pated circumstances, a guidelines system is unable to
individualize sentences when necessary to achieve the rec-
ognized goals and purposes of sentencing. Second,
because no set of sentencing rules is, or ever can be, per-
fect, the rules require continuing analysis and periodic
revision. Departures represent one critical form of feed-
back essential to proper analysis of sentencing rules.
Judges as a class are reluctant to impose sentences outside
of officially sanctioned norms. Accordingly, patterns of
departure in particular classes of cases represent an
important signal from the judiciary (and indeed from the
other frontline sentencing actors who play critical roles in
the departure process) that revisions in the guidelines may
be appropriate.
The need for judicial departure authority is no less
compelling in a simplified system such as that proposed
here. Though the sentencing ranges in the model system
are wider, there will nonetheless be cases in which the
rules setting the ranges fail to account for offense charac-
teristics and personal circumstances that require a
sentence outside the range if justice is to be served.
The particular departure rules proposed here are not
ambitious. They draw heavily on the language of the cur-
rent general departure rule, U.S.S.G. 5K2.o, and envision
a regime of departures not notably different from that
which prevailed throughout the pre-Booker period from
1987 to 2005. The astute reader will immediately note that
the preceding sentence seemingly glosses over the fact
that the extent of judicial departure power has been the
subject of intense debate and that the scope of that
power-or at least the words used to describe its scope-
varied at different times in the pre- Booker period.2 The
gloss is intentional because the purpose of this model
guideline is not to refight every battle of the recent depar-
ture wars. It is rather to indicate that a departure power is
an essential component of the overall simplified system
proposed in these pages and that the scope of the power
should be analogous to that envisioned by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 and enjoyed by judges throughout the
guidelines period.
That said, the departure rules enunciated above do
embody the general preference for flexibility that informs
the entire simplified guidelines project. For example,
Model Guideline 5.i(a) adopts the general phraseology of
the Sentencing Reform Act's provisions on departures and
adds the specific injunction that the decision to depart
must be made "in light of the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant and in order to advance the purposes of sen-
tencing set forth in i8 U.S.C. 5 3553(a)(2), (6), and (7)"
Likewise, the departure rules proposed here omit some of
the more restrictive particulars of the rules adopted by the
Sentencing Commission in the wake of the PROTECT
Act) The working group was unanimous in thinking the
general trend of the post-PROTECT guidelines amend-
ments undesirable. Finally, Model Guideline 5 5.i(f)
prescribes an abuse of discretion standard of review of
departures. This provision reflects two complementary
considerations: First, such a standard is consistent with
the consensus of the working group that enhanced flexi-
bility is generally desirable in a guidelines system. Second,
in a new system, feedback is particularly necessary if rules
are to be refined and improved, and departures represent
a critical form of feedback.
Upward Departures
As noted in the Constitution Project report, 4 in the system
outlined here, because of the rule of Blakely and Booker,
once a defendant is assigned to a box in the simplified grid
based on the jury's fact-finding or the particulars of his
plea, no sentence above the top of that box would be con-
stitutionally possible. In consequence, no "upward
departure" in the current sense of an upward deviation
from the guideline range based on judicial findings of fact
is possible. From a policy point of view, this is not ideal. In
an ideal guidelines system, the usual or customary case
should occupy a middle position from which judges
should have some authority to vary upward or downward
to some degree in unusual cases. However, in designing
any legal framework, one is obliged to play the constitu-
tional hand one is dealt, and the Blakely-Booker tandem
bars upward deviations from jury-created ranges.
Nonetheless, given the width of the ranges in these model
guidelines and the ready availability to the prosecution of
various sentencing-enhancing mechanisms, we have little
doubt that severe punishment will be available in any case
where it is merited.
Prohibited and Discouraged Departure Factors
The current Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain in
Chapter 5, Part H, an extensive list of factors arguably rel-
evant to imposition of a sentence inside or outside of the
applicable range. Broadly speaking, this section of the
guidelines categorizes these factors as encouraged,5 dis-
couraged ("not ordinarily relevant"), 6 or prohibited7 as
grounds for departure. This model departure guideline
does not contain a similar list. Some members of the
working group would probably prefer that no such list be
included in revised and simplified guidelines and that the
identification of appropriate departure factors be left to
the judiciary ruling on a case-by-case basis. They share
the often-expressed view that the current Guidelines
unduly restrict the use of most personal characteristics of
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a defendant as justifications for departure. However, the
omission of a set of guidelines regarding common poten-
tial departure factors from the current project does not
express a policy choice. Rather, time and space con-
straints precluded us from undertaking the thorough
review of this subject that would be required to do it jus-
tice. This model leaves for the future the questions of
whether to replicate something like the current Chapter
5H in a simplified guidelines system and, if so, whether
the restrictions on departures contained in that chapter
should be retained largely unchanged or subjected to sub-
stantial revision. It is fair to say that all members of the
working group would favor, at the least, a thoughtful and
thorough reconsideration of the current approach.
Conclusion
It should be noted that, while our working group would
prefer more flexible departure standards than those
embodied in the text of the current Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the basic simplified guidelines approach
endorsed by the Constitution Project and exemplified in
these model guidelines is workable with varying degrees
of departure flexibility. We cannot emphasize too strongly,
however, that a meaningful departure mechanism that
affords judges appropriate discretion to deal justly with
individual defendants and unusual cases and provides the
feedback essential to improving guidelines rules is indis-
pensable to the system proposed here.
In the end, whether the departure wars between Con-
gress, the Justice Department, and the judiciary would
continue to rage even after the adoption of a simplified
guidelines system would probably depend on the severity
of the sentences in the new system. If, through the
process of formulating a new system, we can assign sen-
tencing ranges that judges, prosecutors, defense counsel,
and the interested public feel are appropriate for the vast
majority of defendants the rules place within them, then
departures will become rare, judges will feel little compul-
sion to depart, and interbranch tension will abate. If, on
the other hand, political considerations were to trump the
judgments of frontline sentencing actors and sentencing
professionals to produce a simple, but unduly harsh, new
regime, then departures would continue to be a flash
point.
Notes
U.S.S.G. §5K2.0 Background (quoting Historical Note to
U.S.S.G. §1A1.1 (Authority)).
2 For example, the opinion in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81 (1996), was widely interpreted as relaxing the standard of
appellate review of downward departures and thus as signal-
ing that district courts should feel somewhat more at liberty
to depart. In 2003, Congress legislatively overturned Koon in
the PROTECT Act by imposing a de novo standard of review
on appeals of downward departures. Section 401(m) of the
PROTECT Act also directed the Sentencing Commission to
amend the guidelines "to ensure that the incidence of down-
ward departures is substantially reduced." The Sentencing
Commission complied with a series of amendments effective
October 27, 2003. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 651.
3 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploita-
tion of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. Law
108-21.
4 Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations
for Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED.
SENT, REP. 310, 316 (2006).
5 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §5H1.1 (stating that, "[a]ge may be a rea-
son to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is
elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as
home confinement might be equally efficient as and less
costly than incarceration").
6 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §5H1.5 (stating that "[e]mployment record
is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure
is relevant").
7 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §5H1.10 (declaring that race, sex, national
origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status "are not rel-
evant in the determination of a sentence").
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